Who is in this organization
Authorization
consoleSession Set by POST /console/v1/sessions. HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict, Path=/, __Host- prefixed. It is never readable by JavaScript and there is no header alternative: accepting both carriers would let an attacker choose the weaker one.
In: cookie
Path Parameters
uuidResponse Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/console/v1/organizations/497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08/members" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer apf_v2_tu_credencial"{ "schemaVersion": "console.1", "requestId": "d385ab22-0f51-4b97-9ecd-b8ff3fd4fcb6", "organizationId": "7bc05553-4b68-44e8-b7bc-37be63c6d9e9", "memberRole": "OWNER", "members": [ { "userId": "2c4a230c-5085-4924-a3e1-25fb4fc5965b", "email": "string", "memberRole": "OWNER", "mfaEnrolled": true, "status": "ACTIVE", "joinedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z" } ]}Ask SUNAT to prove this version POST POST
Answers 202 and nothing is switched yet. A DRAFT reaches ACTIVE only after this platform has signed a factura on the reserved series F000 with that certificate and SUNAT beta has accepted it (000052) — proof of control checked by the party that can check it. PRODUCTION is refused, because a production certificate cannot be proved against beta and issuing a real comprobante to prove it is not the platform's call. This route takes no Idempotency-Key: the key is derived from the version, so a double-click replays instead of probing twice.
Change a member's role PATCH PATCH
OWNER only, and the last OWNER can be neither demoted nor removed. The affected member's sessions are revoked -- theirs alone, since a role change concerns one person and logging the whole team out would turn administration into an outage.